In absence of third-party reporting, taxpayers are required to self-report information with various degrees of detail, ranging from uncorroborated claims to comprehensive records with receipts. Using a quasi-experimental design applied to noncash charitable contribution deductions, I show that even basic self-reporting requirements are effective at reducing evasion but impose large compliance costs on taxpayers. I find that simplified reporting requirements reduce reporting costs by $55 per person and substantially increase claimed donations. However, half of the new donations are due to evasion. Thus, information reporting should only be imposed on total reported donations above a pre-specified threshold.
Introduction
It has been shown that third-party reporting is effective at reducing evasion (Kopczuk and Slemrod (2006) ; Gordon and Li (2009) ; Kleven et al. (2011) ), but there are circumstances in which it is infeasible or prohibitively costly. For example, in many tax systems, self-employed individuals are allowed to deduct expenses such as the use of one's personal car or home space for business purposes. Introducing third-party reporting for such transactions is not possible. Requiring organizations to report all contractual payments (as is currently done with Form 1099-Misc for large transactions in the U.S.) would impose large compliance costs, especially for small businesses. In short, it is unlikely that third-party reporting can be imposed on all income, deductions, expenses and credits that individuals and firms claim on their tax returns. In these circumstances, tax authorities rely on self-reported information to access tax liability.
To limit potential cheating, tax authorities require that self-reported accounts follow a set of "self-reporting" rules. These requirements often range in stringency -from basic requirements to provide unsubstantiated details of claimed expenses to more stringent rules that require receipts to be included with tax returns. However, we know little about the effectiveness of self-reporting at curbing evasion: could a requirement to provide potentially unverifiable information reduce cheating by making the cheating process costlier and by increasing the scope of information available to tax authorities? Moreover, welfare implications are also unclear: even the simplest compliance rules can prove to be costly and impose a burden not only on prospective cheaters, but also on law-abiding individuals. This trade-off between evasion and compliance costs suggests that reporting should be imposed only on a subset of the population. Yet current reporting requirements vary greatly across tax items and often impose all-or-nothing requirements. For example, in the U.S., claiming a cash donation deduction requires no reporting, while claiming the Child and Dependent Care Expenses Credit requires individuals to provide detailed descriptions regardless of the amount claimed.
This paper develops a framework to study self-reporting requirements and reporting thresholds for claiming deductions and expenses. I focus on the simplest form of self-reporting regulations -a requirement to provide selfreported details of claimed deductions with no requirement to attach receipts. Using a natural experiment, I document the effectiveness of self-reporting requirements against evasion and provide estimates of compliance costs and the magnitude of evasion. Empirical results imply that self-reporting requirements should be imposed only on individuals with reported donations above a pre-specified threshold and that setting such a threshold optimally could lead to substantial welfare improvements.
Since 1917, the U.S. federal government has subsidized charitable contributions in the form of a tax deduction. This favorable treatment makes charitable deductions highly susceptible to evasion. To limit potential misreporting, the IRS has developed a set of rules that make evasion costlier. I use a regulation change in 1985 that relaxed self-reporting requirements for noncash charitable contributions. Prior to 1985, individuals had to submit a detailed statement regardless of the dollar value of the reported donations. Starting in 1985, a formal statement, Form 8283, has been required only when reported noncash donations exceed $500. Employing a novel identification approach, I non-parametrically identify the share of new donations due to lower compliance costs and the share of new donations due to evasion, and I estimate the hassle cost of compliance. I find that relaxing reporting requirements led to a steady increase in reported donations but that more than 50% of these new donations were untruthful. The tax revenue loss, however, was offset by substantial savings for taxpayers because reporting requirements impose large hassle costs: $55 (in 2015 dollars), on average, per person. Thus, the empirical findings suggest that while self-reporting requirements are effective at reducing evasion, they are burdensome and, therefore, should be imposed on only a subset of individuals. A calibration exercise in the appendix suggests that setting the threshold optimally at $350 instead of $500 would have reduced welfare losses from evasion and compliance by 70%.
The empirical approach proceeds in two steps. To estimate the compliance costs associated with Form 8283, I compare the distributions of noncash donations above the reporting threshold before and after the reform. Since reporting requirements have not changed for taxpayers who wish to report more than $500, these individuals will choose to reduce their donations and report $500 only to avoid the hassle of filing Form 8283. Therefore, the size of the missing mass to the right of the $500 threshold allows me to estimate the distribution of compliance costs. I find that individuals are willing to forgo an average of $55 (in 2015 dollars) in order to avoid filling out Form 8283. The magnitude of compliance costs is surprisingly high since it is unlikely that filling out Form 8283 would require more than half an hour of one's time. The cost estimate, however, is consistent with the findings of Benzarti (2015) , who estimates that individuals forgo $644, on average, (in 2014 dollars) to avoid filing Schedule A (Itemized Deductions).
Next, I use my estimates of compliance cost to distinguish between truthful and untruthful donations. The 1985 reform increased the threshold from $0 to $500, which resulted in an increase in reported donations below the $500 threshold. To identify which portion of these new donations is due to evasion, I must account for two effects. First, part of the increase in donations in the neighborhood of $500 is due to compliance costs, as described above: some taxpayers choose to reduce their donations and bunch at $500 to avoid the hassle of filling out Form 8283. To account for these individuals, I adjust the post-reform distribution downward by redistributing just enough of the excess mass at $500 to fill in the missing mass above the threshold. Second, since all individuals had to submit a detailed statement before the reform, individuals with high compliance costs who wished to donate small amounts chose to report $0 to avoid the hassle of writing a statement. To account for these taxpayers (who are missing from the observed pre-reform distribution), I extrapolate the compliance cost found in step 1 to identify a "counterfactual" distribution of donations -this counterfactual distribution represents the number of truthful donations prior to the reform if there were no reporting and no evasion. Finally, I quantify evasion as the difference between the adjusted post-reform distribution and the counterfactual pre-reform distribution. Intuitively, once I have accounted for legitimate sources of increased donations (due to the compliance burden before and after the reform), the remaining, unexplained increase in donations at the $500 threshold must be due to evasion.
Overall, I find that at least 48% of the new donations were untruthful. The overall level of evasion, however, is small and suggests that taxpayers find cheating very costly. Even ten years after the reform, the number of donations below $500 remained small. The magnitude of evasion found in this study is generally consistent with evasion estimates from the 1982 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) study. Slemrod (1989) finds that among taxpayers who claim a charitable deduction, 27% cheated and overstated their donation by approximately 9%, which corresponds to an average of $96.4 (1982 dollars). My calibration of evasion behavior suggests that approximately 24% of individuals cheat, with an average cheating amount of $350 (1986 dollars).
The findings of this paper are policy-relevant for three reasons. First, the empirical results show that self-reporting requirements are effective against evasion. In circumstances in which third-party reporting is infeasible or too costly, requiring individuals to fill out a form or provide self-reported accounts can reduce evasion. This is a striking result because it shows that merely asking individuals to provide more information -but requiring no proof -can reduce evasion. Second, the findings confirm the intuition that even these minimal requirements come at a cost and should not be ignored by policy makers. Individuals dislike tax paperwork and find it bothersome. Third, the trade-off between compliance and evasion implies that reporting requirements should not be imposed on all taxpayers. Instead, welfare can be substantially improved by setting reporting thresholds optimally. The identification approach further highlights a path to determining these thresholds: it is best to start with stringent requirements and ease them over time, as this allows for estimation of compliance costs and evasion behavior. While the analysis of this paper focuses on noncash charitable donations, the results can be directly applied to other deductions, credits, and business expenses, and particularly to unverifiable expenses such as the use of one's personal car or home space for business purposes, which are likely to become even more prevalent due to increased use of digital platforms such as Uber and Airbnb.
The paper contributes to three areas of research. First, this study contributes to the empirical literature that investigates the effectiveness of information reporting against evasion. While the literature has carefully documented the power of third-party reporting ( (Kopczuk and Slemrod (2006) ; Gordon and Li (2009); Kleven et al. (2011) ), little is known about the effectiveness of other approaches. In the U.S. and other OECD countries, tax liability often depends on self-reported measures of income and expenses, with varying levels of supporting documentation requirements (Lederman (2010) ). This paper is the first to show that a simple requirement to provide self-reported details of transactions without providing receipts reduces evasion. Previous work has focused on stronger forms of reporting requirements, such as submitting proof of expenses (Fack and Landais (2016) ) or providing easily verifiable information (LaLumia and Sallee (2013) ).
1
Second, the paper contributes to a literature that documents and estimates the high costs of complying with tax regulations. The revealed preference approach taken in this paper is similar to the methodology of Benzarti (2015) , who estimates that an average household is willing to forgo $644 to avoid filing Schedule A.
2 Benzarti's larger estimate accounts for both record-1 See, also, studies of accounting regulations (Asatryan and Peichl (2016) ), monitoring rules (Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2018) ), electronic payments (Slemrod et al. (2017) ), and receipt incentives (Naritomi (2013) ).
2 Previous studies typically rely on survey evidence: e.g. Slemrod and Sorum (1984) ; Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992); and European Commission (2013) . See, also, keeping costs and the process of filling out Schedule A, while the smaller estimate of my study measures primarily the filling-out costs, suggesting that record keeping is most costly to taxpayers. Finally, the existence of both evasion and compliance responses suggests that reporting requirements should be imposed only on a subset of taxpayers. Such compliance thresholds could be chosen in a similar fashion to the tax exemption thresholds studied by Keen and Mintz (2004) , Dharmapala et al. (2011) and Kanbur and Keen (2014) .
Third, the paper suggests a novel nonparametric approach to measuring evasion. Accurately estimating evasion is difficult because researchers cannot directly observe cheating behavior.
3 The approach used in this paper circumvents this problem by studying changes in aggregate distributions, thus avoiding the need to tag individual cheaters. Although several other papers study changes in reporting requirements to identify cheating behavior, most of these studies cannot accurately separate evasion responses from behavioral responses to compliance cost (e.g. Buchheit et al. (2005) ; Ackerman and Auten (2011); Serocki and Murphy (2013) ; Fack and Landais (2016) ).
Within these literatures, several recent papers investigate how charitable giving specifically responds to changes in tax-compliance requirements. Gillitzer and Skov (2018) show that the use of pre-filled forms in Denmark led to a large increase in the number of reported charitable deductions, despite concurrently introducing third-party reporting. Surprisingly, the authors do not find a decrease in the number of large donations, suggesting that over-reporting prior to the reform was small. This finding contradicts the results of Fack and Landais (2016) , who document a large decrease in Pitt and Slemrod (1989) , who use a structural model and find an average cost of itemizing to be $100.
3 For a comprehensive review of the literature on evasion, see, e.g., Andreoni et al. (1998) and Slemrod (2007) . The literature estimates evasion behavior in three general ways. The first approach directly quantifies evasion by looking at the results of tax audits; for examples, see Clotfelter (1983) and Christian (1994) . The second approach estimates evasion indirectly, by looking at discrepancies between reported values and actual spending; see, e.g. Pissarides and Weber (1989); Feldman and Slemrod (2007) ; and Artavanis et al. (2016) . In this paper, I adopt the third approach, which relies on compliance reforms. Besides charitable giving, this approach has been used by LaLumia and Sallee (2013) to study claiming of dependents, and by Marion and Muehlegger (2008) to study evasion in the market for diesel fuel.
reported charitable deductions in France after taxpayers were required to include receipts with their tax returns. Similarly Ackerman and Auten (2011) study the effects of the 2005 U.S. reform that tightened the valuation process for donations of cars, boats and airplanes. They find that prior to the reform, these types of donations were largely overstated and that the reform significantly reduced such donations. All of these studies consider reforms that increased compliance requirements, making it difficult to separate compliance responses from evasion. This paper complements earlier work by studying a reform that simplified tax-compliance rules, thus allowing me to estimate compliance costs and the level of evasion.
Data and Institutional Background

The 1985 Reform
The U.S. Federal Tax Code allows individuals to include their charitable contributions on the list of itemized deductions. With the exception of a short period in the 1980s, no such deductions have been allowed for those who claim the standard deduction.
4 Two types of deductions are allowed: donations made in the form of cash and in the form of assets. Noncash contribution deductions, which are the focus of this paper, are limited to 20% of AGI, and any excess contributions can be carried over to future years.
To reduce the possibility of tax evasion, the tax authorities design a set of regulations, summarized yearly as Publication 526, pertaining to what can be claimed as a charitable contribution, up to what amount, and what supporting documents are required. In this paper, I focus on one of the most salient of these rules: the threshold beyond which individuals need to provide a detailed description of their donations. Prior to 1985, individuals had to attach a statement detailing their noncash donations for any amount of contributions. In particular, individuals had to specify the kind of property given, who it was given to and on what date, how the value was calculated, and whether it was a capital gain or ordinary income property. If the total 4 In 1982 and 1983, those claiming the standard deductions could deduct 25% of their charitable contributions up to a maximum of $25. This limit increased to a maximum of $75 in 1984. In 1985, the policy changed to allow individuals to deduct 50% of their charitable contributions with no upper limit. The rule became even more generous the following year: 100% of charitable contributions were deductible with no upper limit in 1986. The policy was canceled in 1987.
asset contribution exceeded $200, individuals also had to specify the address of the charitable organization, a description of the property, any conditions attached to the gift, how the individual initially obtained the property, and more detailed information on the initial cost and current valuation of the property. Starting in 1985, individuals had to fill out and attach Form 8283 only if they claim more than $500 in noncash charitable donations. Otherwise, no forms are necessary. Form 8283 requires individuals to provide the same information as when donating more than $200 in the past. Depending on the actual amount claimed and the type of items given, further restrictions apply: for example, for very large donations, a formal appraisal might be required. In this paper, I focus on charitable contributions around the $500 threshold for which appraisals and other restrictions do not apply. The requirement to file Form 8283 is very salient: Schedule A explicitly states that "one must attach Form 8283 if over $500" next to the noncash donation box.
Importantly, no other major tax changes happened in 1985 that could affect the likelihood or magnitude of charitable donations. The largest changes included: inflation adjustment of tax brackets and exemption amounts; changes to child exemptions for divorced and separated parents; and changes to reporting rules for alimony payments.
The remaining compliance requirements for charitable donations during the 1980s were minimal. Individuals did not need to attach written proof of their contributions, but they were required to keep accurate records. While actual receipts and written statements were preferred, "reliable written records" were deemed appropriate for any amount of contributions. The instructions in Publication 526 state that "records may be considered reliable if they were made at or near the time of the contribution, were regularly kept by you, or if, in the case of small donations, you have buttons, emblems, or other tokens, that are regularly given to persons making small cash contributions." Records should include the name of the organization, the date of the contribution, and the amount of the contribution.
The 1985 reform was previously studied by Buchheit et al. (2005) and Serocki and Murphy (2013) . Buchheit et al. (2005) were the first to document the persistent and increasing spike at the $500 threshold for noncash charitable donations. The authors argue that the sharp increase in charitable donations after the reform is a sign of evasion. However, the authors do not attempt to differentiate between bunching due to compliance costs, due to inflation and due to evasion. Serocki and Murphy (2013) focus on the introduction of an appraisal requirement for noncash charitable donations above $5,000. Because this regulatory change increased compliance rules above the cutoff, the authors are not able to differentiate between evaders and individuals who find the need to obtain an appraisal too bothersome.
Data
I use annual cross-sections of individual tax returns constructed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and commonly known as the Statistics of Income (SOI) Public Use Files, for years 1970-2009. The annual crosssections are stratified random samples of approximately 80,000-200,000 tax returns per year with randomization over the Social Security Number (SSN). High-income taxpayers and those with business income are oversampled, but weights are provided. Since, for the majority of years charitable deductions, could be claimed only by itemizers, I restrict the sample to individuals who itemized in that tax year. Moreover, because noncash donations are limited to 20% of AGI, I further restrict the sample to taxpayers whose overall charitable contributions do not exceed 20% of AGI, which is the case for approximately 98% of tax filers.
The unweighted number of observations are provided in Panel A of Table  1 . Panel B of Table 1 provides appropriately weighted summary statistics. In 1984, among taxpayers who filed a tax return and itemized, approximately 22% claimed noncash charitable donations, for a total of $12.68 billion dollars and with a median donation of $435 (all in 2015 dollars). Among these, 95% reported contributions of less than $2,000. The average contribution for all individuals who donated a positive amount less than $2,000 was $655, with a median of $424. Overall, those who donated less than $2,000 accounted for 41% of the dollar value of noncash donations. The number of noncash contributions has substantially increased since 1984. In the latest year of data available, 2009, approximately 48% of all itemizers reported noncash donations, for a total of $35.96 billion dollars. Nevertheless, the majority of individuals -89% -still donate less than $2,000, which corresponds to an average donation of $572. Panel B of Table 1 shows that the number of noncash donations increased dramatically over the years, but the median and average donation amounts remained roughly the same. 
Suggestive Evidence
In this section, I provide graphical evidence of the effects of the 1985 reform. To motivate the analysis, consider the distributions of reported noncash charitable donations from 1979 to 2009. Figure 1 shows the number of positive donations (unadjusted for inflation) in $100 bins, starting with (0,$100], as a percent of all itemizers in that year.
5 The vertical line marks the $500 reporting threshold introduced in 1985. Three observations are striking. First, the 1985 reform, as originally documented by Buchheit et al. (2005) , led to a persistent spike in the distribution of noncash donations at $500. Second, the observed bunching is concentrated just below the threshold -i.e. in the $400-$500 range -suggesting that individuals are careful not to report donations above the threshold. Without further analysis, it is not possible to determine whether the increase in donations is due to evasion or due to an increase in reported donations by taxpayers who have previously not reported or not donated because of compliance costs. Third, the excess mass at $500 has grown over the years. Given that the threshold has been nominally fixed since 1985 and since inflation pushes charitable donations rightward, at least part of the growth can be attributed to inflation rather than to increased evasion. Figure 2 overlaps the distributions of reported noncash charitable donations in 1984 and 1985, and in 1984 and 1986 , all unadjusted for inflation. In addition to an increase in the number of reported donations below $500, Figure 2 documents a decrease in the number of donations above $500. Since the compliance requirements have not changed above the threshold, a decline in donations to the right of the threshold is direct evidence of the existence of compliance costs. Intuitively, if individuals with reported donations above $500 were willing to cheat under the old rules, they should be willing to cheat under the new rules. Hence, reductions in reported donations above the threshold represent attempts to avoid compliance costs rather changes in cheating behavior, as discussed in greater detail in Section 4. It is notable that the size of the spike increased from 1985 to 1986. It is possible that taxpayers discovered the compliance rule change only when they started preparing their tax return, at which point donations had already been made. Alternatively, cheating may have increased over time as taxpayers became accustomed to the new rules. In Figure 4 , I plot the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of dollar value of contributions (all inflated to 2015 dollars). Figure 4 shows that an increase in noncash donations is unlikely to have been due to the crowding out of cash contributions. All percentiles of cash donations did not decrease in 1985 and, instead, increased after the passage of the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Meanwhile, noncash donations steadily grew in value. Figures 5(a) and (b) show even more clearly that there was no substitution between the two types of donations in 1985: the distribution of cash donations was not affected by the 1985 reform. The distributions overlap very well, suggesting that the observed changes to the distribution of noncash donations were driven by the change in compliance rules, since any changes to the financial incentives of charitable giving or itemizing would have affected both cash and noncash donations. Figure 5 (c) confirms that it is also unlikely that such a substitution happened in later years, as cash contributions remained relatively stable, with an increase in the amount of cash donations after the 1986 Tax Reform.
Finally, as a robustness check, I plot the distributions of noncash donations prior to the reform in Figure 5 (d). These distributions overlap closely, suggesting that while individual donations may have varied substantially from year to year, aggregate donations remained very stable. Therefore, the 1984 distribution represents an accurate counterfactual density to study the effect of the 1985 reform on noncash charitable giving.
Empirical Approach
Conceptual Framework
Consider an individual i who allocates his earnings Y i between consumption C and charitable giving X, and who obtains a government subsidy τ for reporting donations R. The government announces a pre-determined threshold T and requires individuals to fill out some paperwork whenever their reported donations exceed the threshold. Further, suppose that evasion is 100% detectable whenever R > T . If an individual overstates his reported donations by declaring R > X, he experiences evasion cost h i0 + h i (R − X) with h i0 ≥ 0, h ′ i ≥ 0 and h i (z) = ∞ for all z ≥ T . In addition, individual experiences a fixed compliance cost φ i ≥ 0 whenever he reports R > T . In this setting, the subscript i allows for heterogeneity in charitable giving preferences, as well as in magnitudes of compliance and evasion costs. In sum, individual i solves Several observations follow from (1). First, if the threshold is set to zero, then no individuals are able to cheat because of the infinitely high cost of evasion, and all individuals must pay the compliance cost if they report positive donations. Therefore, some individuals will choose to report R = 0, despite donating a positive amount, in order to avoid the compliance cost φ i .
6 Second, if the threshold is positive, then cheating is possible only below the threshold. Hence, individuals with strong preferences for charitable giving will not cheat, and instead will report R = X > T and bear the cost of compliance, or report R = T < X and avoid the compliance cost.
7 Third, if the threshold is positive, evasion would be present only below the threshold, and the magnitude of cheating would be determined by the relative magnitudes of the fixed and variable costs of evasion, h i0 and h i (R − X), respectively.
8 If the variable costs of evasion are small, individuals will maximize their utility by reporting their donations to be equal to the threshold amount T .
The model makes four key predictions about the effects of the 1985 reform. Prior to 1985, the reporting threshold was set to zero -all taxpayers had to submit a written statement as long as they reported a positive donation. Thus, the first prediction is that some taxpayers with a preference for giving "bunched" at $0 (to avoid the compliance cost), and, therefore, the observed 1984 distribution of noncash charitable donations has a missing mass just above the 1984 reporting threshold, $0. When the threshold was moved to $500 in 1985, individuals who were previously bunching at $0 would have found it optimal to report their contributions as long as they did not exceed $500. Thus, the second prediction of the model, is that we should observe an increase in genuine donations in 1985 below $500. At the 6 Individual i will choose a triple (C, X, R) that generates the highest level of utility among the following three options: (a) an interior solution (C, X, R) = (
is greater than or equal to T . Individual i will choose a triple (C, X, R) that generates the highest level of utility among the following three options: (a) an interior solution (C, X, R) = (
same time, some individuals who donated more than $500 in the past would now choose to bunch at $500 to avoid the compliance cost. Hence, the third prediction is that we should observe a missing mass in the distribution of observed donations in 1985 above $500 and a corresponding excess mass at $500. Finally, because self-reporting rules were simplified in 1985 and evasion became possible, the fourth prediction stipulates that some of the donations below the $500 threshold in 1985 might be untruthful.
The four predictions suggest an identification strategy for disentangling increases in reported donations due to evasion from increases due to compliance costs. Below, I briefly summarize the empirical approach, identifying assumptions are discussed in Section 4.2 and implementation details are available in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. I proceed in three steps. First, using prediction #3, I measure the compliance costs associated with filing Form 8283. To do so, I compare the observed distribution of noncash donations in 1984 to the observed 1985 distribution above $500. Since the rules for donations above $500 have not changed, it follows that the only reason that individuals would switch from donating more than $500 to donating precisely $500 is to avoid the cost of filing Form 8283. Therefore, one can use the differences between the 1984 and 1985 distributions to back out compliance costs. Bunching by these individuals represents neither new donations, nor cheating donations. I account for this by removing just enough of the excess mass at $500 to fill in the missing mass to the right of the threshold.
Second, I use my measure of compliance costs to estimate an increase in genuine donations due to simplified self-reporting requirements (predictions #1 and #2). To do so, I make a simplifying assumption that the cost of writing a statement in 1984 was equivalent to the cost of filling out Form 8283 in 1985. The assumption relies on the fact that the content of the statement is equivalent to that of Form 8283; thus, both actions should require approximately the same amount of effort. If the two costs are equivalent, then the proportion of taxpayers who chose to forgo the deduction in 1984 should correspond to the proportion of taxpayers who chose to bunch in 1985, bin by bin. Thus, I can estimate the number of individuals who would have reported in 1984 if self-reporting was not required, by appropriately scaling the observed 1984 distribution upward.
Third, I measure evasion as the difference between the total observed increase in donations after the reform, minus the estimated increase in genuine donations from step 2 (prediction #4). In other words, I define evasion as the difference between the adjusted 1985 distribution -which removes bunching at $500 from the right -and the counterfactual 1984 distribution -which accounts for an increase in genuine donations due to simplified reporting rules. Intuitively, once we have accounted for legitimate sources of increased donations below the threshold, the remaining excess donations represent evasion.
Identification Assumptions
The approach described in the previous section relies on several assumptions. In this section, I briefly discuss the validity of each assumption. The failure of these assumptions would imply that the results present a lower bound on the magnitude of evasion, but the qualitative results of the paper remain intact. Assumption 2: compliance costs are fixed, and the distribution of compliance costs is similar across individuals. The cost of filling out Form 8283 is likely to depend on the number of items described rather than the overall dollar value. Unfortunately, the available data do not provide details on the type and number of donations made. Since there is no reason to believe that individuals who make larger donations necessarily give more items rather than the same number of items but of higher value, one can reasonably asthe first bin, $0 to $100, of the observed 1984 distribution by multiplying the number of donors in that bin by 1/(1 − 0.7) to account for the 70% of missing donors. I repeat this procedure for the next bin, etc. The adjustment stops when the proportion of taxpayers who chose to bunch at $500 instead of reporting the actual number of donations in 1985 is zero.
sume that the cost of compliance is fixed, but heterogeneous. Individuals who bunched at $0 in 1984 are poorer and had lower MTRs and a potentially lower opportunity cost of time than individuals who bunched at $500 in 1985. Thus, the chosen approach is likely to overestimate the compliance cost of writing a statement in 1984 and, therefore, underestimate the amount of evasion. Therefore, the results in this study generate a lower bound on the true amount of evasion generated by the 1985 reform. If compliance cost heterogeneity is driven by income differences, I partially circumvent this concern by estimating compliance and evasion responses separately for each quartile of adjusted gross income in Appendix A. Assumption 3: cheating is possible only below the threshold. If filling out Form 8283 does not prevent taxpayers from cheating, then the described approach underestimates the magnitude of total evasion. The main concern about the chosen identification strategy is the possibility that some individuals experienced an increase in both compliance and evasion costs at $500, in which case my estimate of compliance cost is biased upward, and the results again generate a lower bound on the true amount of evasion. This would be the case if, for example, the evasion cost is fixed and depends on the level of self-reporting requirements: low when no reporting is required and high when some reporting is necessary. While this is possible, the magnitude of the bias is likely to be small for two reasons. First, only decreases in fixed costs of evasion would persuade individuals to reduce their reported donations since, for individuals who report more than $500, the marginal cost of evasion does not change (both before and after the reform, they had to fill out Form 8283). Second, the results in Section 5.2 will show that, while individuals reported many untruthful noncash donations after the reform, the overall magnitude of cheating was rather small, suggesting that even when self-reporting is not required, the fixed and marginal costs of evasion are high enough to discourage individuals from cheating. If the cost of cheating is even higher in the presence of self-reporting, the number of evaders prior to the 1985 reform is likely to be very low. Both arguments imply that, while a change in compliance requirements affected all individuals -those who cheated and those who did not cheat -the change in evasion costs would have only affected a small group of cheaters. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that changes in the cost of evasion are of second order to the changes in compliance costs experienced by these individuals. Hence, relaxing the third assumption and allowing for cheating above the self-reporting thresholds does not change the validity of the results, merely the interpretation. If self-reporting does not prevent individuals from cheating, this study estimates evasion by taxpayers who are influenced by the self-reporting requirement -the ultimate group of interest from the policy perspective -and disregards individuals who cheat, regardless of reporting requirements.
Assumption 4: Form 8283 is viewed as equivalent to the hand-written statement. While the content of the written statement that was required prior to 1985 is identical to that of Form 8283, individuals might view Form 8283 as more "official" and, therefore, interpret the reform as an increase in scrutiny. If this were the case, part of the decrease in donations to the right of the $500 threshold could be due to reductions in cheating, which would then lead to overestimation of compliance costs and underestimation of evasion responses.
Finally, it is possible that individuals choose to bunch at the compliance threshold because they think that the probability of being audited is higher if their reported donations exceed the threshold, regardless of whether or not they cheat on charitable donations. With this possibility in mind, the comliance costs should be interpreted broadly and encompass both the opportunity cost of time for filling out Form 8283, the psychological hassle cost of doing so, and the expected cost of future audits. 
Estimating Evasion and Compliance Costs
Empirical Results: Identifying Evasion
It is likely that individuals learned about the compliance change in the beginning of 1986, when they began preparing their 1985 tax return but after they had made their 1985 donations. For this reason, I study changes in noncash donations in both 1985 and 1986 . Extending the analysis to later years is problematic because of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. When comparing the 1984 and 1985/1986 distributions, I choose not to adjust for inflation; however, the results are not very sensitive to inflation adjustments (see Appendix A). 5(a)-(b) ). Third, many noncash donations are multiples of $100, which means that any inflation adjustment would "push" these donations into the larger bin.
12 The implemented approach can be applied directly to the observed counts of noncash donations in 1984 and 1985. However, using polynomial approximation results in more accurate estimates of compliance costs, described in Section 5.2.2. The recovered counterfactual -dashed-diamond line -is presented in Figure 6 (b). The adjustment procedure grossly overestimates the number of potential new donors in the ($0, $300] region. Two explanations are possible. First, these individuals' compliance costs might be significantly lower than assumed, leading to an overestimate of missing donations. However, accounting for variation in income or other observable characteristics still results in an overestimation of small donations (see the heterogeneity analysis in Appendix A). A more likely explanation is that some taxpayers do not bother reporting all of their charitable donations even when compliance requirements are low. This is consistent with the findings of Gillitzer and Skov (2018) , who document that the introduction of pre-populated forms significantly increased the claims of small charitable donations. Both explanations imply that the estimated counterfactual represents an upper bound on donations that would have been reported in 1984 if individuals had not been required to write a statement and could not cheat.
The adjustment procedure suggests that all new donations below $400 in 1985 are likely to have been genuine. In other words, individuals who found it too costly to write a statement in 1984 started to report donations in 1985. However, in the [$400, $500] region, the adjusted 1985 density is greater than the recovered counterfactual 1984 density. This suggests that even after removing the excess mass from $500 (to account for those who bunched from the right) and after accounting for legitimate new donors (who found it too costly to report in 1984), there remains an "unexplained" excess mass at $500. These individuals must have been cheating. 
This counterfactual is built on the assumption that some share of individuals in the population choose not to report their donations, regardless of the compliance rules, and that these individuals are spread uniformly across the compliance cost spectrum. The main advantage of this counterfactual is that it matches the number of actual observed donations after the reform. Since 
Empirical Results: Quantifying Compliance Costs and Evasion
The 1985 reform had several effects. First, it removed compliance costs for individuals donating less than $500. This decrease in compliance costs also led to an increase in genuine donations. Second, it decreased the number of donations above $500 and led to more evasion. Table 2 
Quantifying Evasion
Quantifying evasion requires an additional assumption, as one cannot observe how much, if at all, the evaders have actually donated. To estimate the amount of cheating donations I rely on the following two approaches. For the lower bound counterfactual, I assume that each evader donated $100. Two justifications for this choice. First, cheating is likely to be confined to experienced "donors." If all individuals were willing to cheat, one would expect a surge in cheating donations over time since individuals who make $0 noncash donations could cheat by some positive amount. Yet Figure 3 documents that the number of noncash donors increased from 20% in 1984 to only 40% in 1995 -ten years after the reform. One possible explanation is that taxpayers were unaware of this evasion channel because they were not familiar with the reporting rules. However, this justification is partially inconsistent with the fact that more than 80% of itemizers reported cash donations and, therefore, must be somewhat familiar with the regulations associated with the charitable giving deduction. Second, from For the upper bound counterfactual, the dollar value of evasion can be estimated directly from Figure 8 because the total number of counterfactual donors matches the number of observed donors below the threshold in 1985/86. Therefore, evasion is the difference between the area under the adjusted 1985/86 distribution (with bunching from the right due to compliance costs removed) and the area under the upper bound 1984 counterfactual distribution. In other words, the cheating donations equal the difference between the total reported below-the-threshold donations in 1985/86 and the total predicted donations.
Using the lower bound counterfactual, I find that the reform led to $78 million of false donations in 1985 and $340 million in 1986. This suggests that 20% of the observed increase in donations in 1985 and 48% in 1986 were due to evasion. The upper bound estimates imply higher levels of evasion -49-67%.
While the observed levels of cheating are generally consistent with the findings from other studies (see Slemrod (2007) for a review), the low levels of cheating are nonetheless surprising because charitable giving is not thirdparty reported and the likelihood of getting caught is extremely low. As was discussed in Section 2.1, in contrast to cash donations for which receipts are generally required, receipts are not required for noncash donations if "it is impractical to get one (for example, if you leave property at a charity's unattended drop site)." Thus, in case of an audit, it would be very difficult to prove that a taxpayer who reported $500 worth of noncash donations is cheating.
Appendix A explores whether evasion is more prevalent among certain demographic groups. The results suggest that richer individuals might evade more, but the differences are not statistically significant. Similarly, I find little variation in the amount of evasion among single and married individuals, individuals who use tax preparers and those who do not, and among those who report some self-employment income and those who do not.
Quantifying Compliance Costs
One major benefit of the 1985 reform was the removal of compliance costs for all individuals who donate $500 or less. As discussed in Section 4.1, individuals who chose to bunch at $500 either reduced their donations, thus forgoing some utility from giving, or reported less, thus forgoing part of the tax deduction. Since reporting precisely the threshold amount implies forgoing part of the deduction, the optimal donation depends on the individual's decision to donate at the marginal cost of one dollar instead of 1 − τ . Given an average marginal tax rate of 30% and a plausible range of elasticities of charitable giving, ranging between -0.3 to -1.3 (Andreoni (2006); Hungerman and Ottoni-Wilhelm (2016) ), most individuals will find it optimal to reduce their donation significantly, and many will reduce it to $500 precisely.
13 Therefore, as a first approach, I estimate a lower bound on compliance costs by assuming that individuals reduce their donations to $500. Second, I also estimate an upper bound on compliance costs by assuming that individuals choose to forgo the subsidy. While the first approach requires an estimate of forgone utility due to the suboptimal amount of donations made, the advantage of the second approach is in its simplicity: it relies on a revealed preference argument and requires no parametric assumptions about utility functions. In both cases, I assume that charitable giving is a small share of the overall income, and, therefore, individuals' utility can be approximated with a quasilinear utility function -i.e. U i (C, X) = C +u xi (X).
Let X * denote the amount of donations an individual would make if compliance costs were zero and evasion was not possible. Then,
Case 1: Individuals reduce donations. Taxpayer i will report and donate $500 if the utility from doing so is higher than reporting and donating X * :
Therefore, taxpayer i will report and donate $500 if
. The percentage of people who continue to contribute in 1985 gives us the values of the cumulative distribution function of compliance cost, F φ , since for each bin b j = ($500, $600], ($600, $700], etc. with average donation j = $550, $650, etc. we have
Case 2: Individuals do not reduce donations. Alternatively, taxpayer i will choose to donate X * i but report $500 if the utility from doing so is higher than donating and reporting X * i :
Therefore, I can estimate the distribution of compliance cost φ i ∼ F φ by quantifying the amount of forgone deductions above $500 in 1985 as compared to 1984. Thus, for bins b j with average donations j, we have
Equations (3) and (4) specify two approaches to estimating the cost of compliance. The first approach assumes that both donations and claiming decreased, while the second approach assumes that donations remained the same but claiming decreased. In 1985, individuals who reported noncash donations in the range of [$500, $1000] had an average marginal tax rate of 29.4%, while in 1986, the average tax rate was 30.08%. I use these tax rates to back out the cumulative distribution of compliance cost using formulas (3) and (4). To estimate the cost of compliance using (3), I set ε = 0.23, which corresponds to an estimate of elasticity of charitable giving of 1/(ε − 1) = −1.3. Table 2 presents the results of these calculations. Under the first assumption, I find that individuals are willing to forgo up to $27-$51, on average, in order to avoid filling out Form 8283 (in 1985 Form 8283 (in /1986 . Under the second assumption, I calculate the average cost of filling out Form 8283 as $71-$99. In addition to the average cost of filing, Table 2 also shows cumulative savings from simplified compliance requirements. These savings rely on the number of donors in 1984 (unadjusted) and account for the fact that these individuals self-selected into donating and, therefore, had lower-than-average compliance costs. The results show that even under a more conservative assumption (using (3)), the 1985 reform decreased compliance costs by $18-30 million (1985/1986 dollars) .
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The estimates of compliance cost -$27-$51 in 1985/1986 dollars or $55-$107 in 2015 dollars -are rather high considering the content of Form 8283. It is unlikely that filling out Form 8283 would take more than an hour of one's time. Several explanations are possible. First, filling out Form 8283 might be time-consuming because doing so requires taxpayers to learn the rules, obtain Publication 526, and organize receipts. Second, individuals might procrastinate on filing tax returns until the deadline, at which point the cost of filing any additional tax forms can be particularly high. Third, individuals might choose to not exceed the reporting threshold because they think that doing so will increase the probability of being audited. In this study, I am not able to differentiate between these alternative explanations. However, the results of Benzarti (2015) , who studies the decision to itemize and explores various explanations for the high estimated cost of filing Schedule A, suggest that high hassle costs and procrastination are the most likely explanations for the observed behavior.
The heterogeneity analysis in Appendix A provides some suggestive evidence that high-income individuals and taxpayers who employ the help of a tax-preparer or who file Schedules C, E, F might experience lower costs of compliance. The differences, however, are not statistically significant.
Policy Implications and Conclusion
The results of this paper highlight the effectiveness of self-reporting requirements against evasion. In circumstances in which third-party reporting is not feasible or is too costly, requiring individuals to fill out a form or provide self-reported details of transactions can reduce evasion, even if the provided information is unverifiable. This approach can be particularly use-ful for transactions that do not generate receipts. For example, commonlyclaimed expenses, such as the use of one's personal car or home space for business purposes, are regulated but very difficult to verify. Asking individuals to provide more information for these types of transactions could reduce evasion substantially. Importantly, self-reporting provides a lasting solution to evasion: in 2009, even 24 years after the reform, Figure 1 shows large bunching at the $500 threshold in the distribution of noncash donations.
While the results of this study show that self-reporting helps reduce evasion, it is unlikely that self-reporting eliminates cheating completely. As Ackerman and Auten (2011) document, taxpayers often exaggerate estimated values of donated items even when they fill out Form 8283. Whether this is done deliberately is unclear: individuals may overvalue personal possessions because these items carry non-monetary values -e.g., through memories. In general, the results of this paper support the view that individuals do not always cheat even when given an opportunity. For most wage earners, deductions are the only opportunity to reduce taxable income, and noncash deductions are the hardest to verify. Because receipts are generally required for cash donations but not for noncash donations, one would expect noncash deductions to be more heavily utilized. Yet, even 20 years after the reporting rules were simplified, less than 50% of itemizers report any amount of noncash donations. This finding suggests that individuals are likely to experience high fixed and variable costs of evasion, in line with previous studies that document low levels of cheating (e.g., Slemrod (2007) ). The low rate of cheating is unlikely to be due to lack of information: nearly 90% of itemizers report making cash contributions and, therefore, must be somewhat familiar with tax rules.
The results also call attention to the cost of complying with tax regulations and caution policy makers against excessive requirements. My estimates of compliance costs suggest that individuals are willing to forgo up to $55-$107, on average, not to provide a simple account of their noncash donations. Since the estimate is calculated by observing individuals who continue to report positive noncash donations, the estimated compliance cost primarily measures the cost of filling out the statement, rather than the costs of collecting information about their donations or keeping track of receipts. This is the likely explanation for why this paper's compliance estimate of $55-$107 is much lower than that of Benzarti (2015) , who shows that individuals are willing to forego up to $644 to avoid the hassle of filing Schedule A (itemized deductions). Benzarti (2015) estimates the cost by observing individuals who choose between itemizing and claiming the standard deduction; choosing the latter avoids not only the cost of filling out Schedule A, but also the cost of record keeping. Therefore, while more-complicated forms are likely to generate higher compliance costs, it is the record keeping that appears to matter the most.
Altogether, the high value of hassle costs and low levels of cheating imply that the government should not impose self-reporting requirements on all citizens, but only on part of the population. To better understand how the reporting thresholds should be set and to determine whether the chosen reporting threshold was set optimally, I calibrate a simple model in Appendix B. In the model, I assume that the government maximizes a social welfare function that accounts for individual utilities, externalities from charitable giving and the cost of providing the subsidy. I show that when determining the optimal reporting threshold, policy makers should weigh the utility and externality losses due to compliance requirements against the tax revenue loss generated by evasion. The reporting threshold is governed primarily by the type and magnitude of cheating: if variable costs of evasion are low and individuals are willing to cheat by large amounts, a low threshold is necessary. However, if variable costs are high, then the optimal threshold depends on the relative magnitudes of the evasion amount and the compliance costs. Overall, in the presence of positive compliance costs and nonzero cheating, it is never optimal to set the threshold at zero or to have no threshold at all. Calibration of the model suggests that setting the threshold at $350 instead of $500 would have reduced welfare losses from evasion and compliance by 70%.
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The approach employed in this paper thus highlights a path to determining optimal levels of self-reporting: it is best to start with stringent requirements and ease them over time, as this allows for identification of compliance costs and evasion behavior.
While the analysis of this paper focuses on noncash charitable donations, the approach can be directly applied to other settings -in particular, to other tax deductions and credits, as well as to business expenses. The external validity of the results and the recommendations for optimal thresholds 15 In other words, let W 0 measure individuals' welfare if cheating was not possible and compliance costs are zero. Let W X measure individuals' welfare if cheating is possible and compliance costs are as estimated and the threshold is set to $X. Then the estimated welfare gains are ∆W = W optimal −W 500 W0−W 500
.
